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LL DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS MUST ENGAGE in a constant
s t ruggle to protect human rights. This is true in times of
peace and calm. It is especially true in times of war or in a
state of emergency, where the challenge assumes far gre a t e r
dimensions. Israel is no exception. Fu rt h e r m o re, as both internal and
external terror has forced Is r a e l’s Su p reme Court to deal with a myriad of
cases requiring a difficult balance between human rights and national
s e c u r i t y, it may indeed possess the most recent and compre h e n s i ve
“hands on” experience in confronting this difficult issue that plagues a
g rowing number of countries.
Israel has been forced to utilize a wide variety of means to battle ter-
rorism, many of which by their ve ry nature infringe upon human rights
and thus greatly challenge human rights-minded courts. This challenge
may even be greater in the State of Israel, not only due to the unique re a l-
ity the State faces, but also due to its lack of a formal constitution.
ISRAELI BASIC LAWS AND THE LIMITATIONS CLAUSE
IN RECENT YEARS, ISRAEL has enacted two new Basic Laws granting
constitutional status to various human rights, although the protections of
the rights mentioned therein are limited. The Basic Laws contain prov i-
sions protecting statutes, enacted prior to their entering into force, fro m
judicial re v i ew. As most of the statutes relating to national security fall
under these provisions, their content is theoretically protected. T h e
Su p reme Court, howe ve r, has repeatedly held that even statutes enacted
prior to the Basic Laws must be interpreted to the extent possible in light
of the dire c t i ves of the Basic Laws, allowing for much protection of
human rights to be afforded. Laws authorizing governmental authorities
to infringe upon human rights are interpreted strictly and narrow l y. In
addition, we generally limit any discretion given to governmental author-
ities so as to guarantee that human rights are not infringed upon any
m o re than absolutely necessary.
As is well known, human rights are generally not seen as being
absolute, but the right to life, necessary to enable the potential exe rcise of
other human rights, is a common exception. Most countries consider the
right to life to be absolute and thus the balancing of human rights against
public safety is especially delicate. Clearly, when dealing with the pre ve n-
tion of terrorism, this reality is especially acute.
In Israel basic rights, whether set forth in Basic Laws, re g u l a r
statutes, or the common law, are not absolute. Their limitation must
comply with the “Limitation Clause” contained in Basic Law: Hu m a n
Dignity and Libert y. This clause was inspired by an article to the same
effect in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This Limitation
Clause states that “[th]e rights conferred by this Basic Law shall not be
infringed save where provided by a law which befits the values of the
State of Israel, intended for a proper purpose, and to an extent no gre a t e r
than re q u i red, or under an aforesaid law by virtue of an explicit author-
ization there i n . ”
On its face, this Limitation Clause provides a prescription for ways
in which the infringements on human rights shall be carried out, but the
matter is often quite difficult.
One of the major theoretical difficulties stems from the fact that in
Israel a significant portion of the fight against terrorism takes place in the
occupied territories, over which Is r a e l’s sove reignty is at best questionable.
Thus, the application of Israeli law and the adjudication of Israeli court s
over matters concerning these territories are not simple matters. In re a l i-
t y, this problem is largely ignored. The Israeli Su p reme Court, sitting as
the High Court of Justice – Is r a e l’s central court in matters of constitu-
tional and administrative law – routinely deals with petitions, filed by re s-
idents of the occupied territories and by others, re g a rding the activities of
the Israeli army in these areas. Not only has the Government of Is r a e l
n e ver questioned the jurisdiction of Israeli courts over such matters, it has
explicitly requested that the Court deal with such petitions, probably in
o rder to gain legal, public, and even international legitimacy. The legal
basis for this adjudication is that the Israeli army is an Israeli gove r n m e n-
tal authority and as such is subject to the jurisdiction of Israeli courts eve n
when operating outside the borders of the State. Although it is accepted
that the primary legal norms that bind Israeli authorities in the territories
a re those of international law, as a governmental authority, the army –
e ven when acting in the occupied territories – is bound, first and fore-
most, to the principles of Israeli constitutional and administrative law.
It seems the dilemmas embedded in the relationship betwe e n
democracy and the battles against terrorism are commonly pre s e n t e d
t h rough an institutional prism that expresses a realistic legal outlook. T h e
question that is often asked both in Israel and in other countries is, “w h a t
a re the limits of judicial intervention in the anti-terror policies of the gov-
ernment, the army, and other national security entities?” To be more pre-
cise, the question is, “how should or could courts limit the means that
other agencies employ in fighting terror?” Security authorities are pur-
p o rtedly responsible for protecting and pre s e rving all aspects of democ-
r a c y, including not only its existence but also those aspects concerning
human rights. Experience, howe ve r, proves that in reality authorities not
only in Israel, but also in other modern democratic states, are inclined to
f a vor security interests. This is particularly evident during emergency
periods, where to such authorities their duty to protect human rights
seems to be secondary to their responsibility to ensure the security of the
c i t i zens and residents of their state. This behavior may be explained by
the fact that a democratic government, as a re p re s e n t a t i ve of the people,
may feel obliged to conform to the common public tendency to favor a
rigid and uncompromising stance that grants national security a pro m i-
nent status. Fu rt h e r m o re, it is also explained by the fact that security
authorities are usually only experts in security. They consider themselve s
responsible for achieving optimal security. From their point of view,
human rights considerations are only “e x t e r n a l” constraints, carrying an
inferior status. Courts are there f o re the dominant guardians and pro t e c-
tors of human rights, especially in times of emergency. The Court assume
the vital role of balancing human rights and security considerations, so as
to ensure the former are not trampled by the latter.
In what follows, I would like to present several legal problems that
e p i t o m i ze the tension between human rights and national security, with
which the Israeli Su p reme Court has recently been forced to deal.
LONG-TERM DETENTION OF LEBANESE CITIZENS
THE FIRST ISSUE I will discuss is that of the long-term detention of
Lebanese citizens in Israel. The Law of Ad m i n i s t r a t i ve Detention author-
i zes the defense minister to detain an individual without trial. The pur-
pose of this law is to pre vent a threat to public security. This is achieve d
t h rough the use of detention in a situation in which regular criminal pro-
ceedings cannot guarantee this public security. In such cases, the evidence
is generally based on classified intelligence, which is likely to harm
national security if re vealed. The law, howe ve r, also re q u i res that this
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a d m i n i s t r a t i ve or “p re ve n t a t i ve” detention, which is limited to an extend-
able six month period, be approved by the president of the Di s t r i c t
C o u rt. The president of the District Court must then continue to re v i ew
the arrest warrant eve ry three months. It is important to note that the
a p p roval process is not one of judicial re v i ew but rather the court itself,
not the defense minister, must be convinced that the administrative
detention and the length of its duration are justified. For this reason, clas-
sified evidentiary materials are presented to the court and there is a right
to appeal the District Court pre s i d e n t’s decision imposing administrative
detention to the Su p reme Court .
Based on the authority granted in this law, Lebanese citizens who
we re members of the Hi z b a l l a h organization (an Iranian-backed and
Sy r i a n - s u p p o rted militia that has waged a small-scale war against Is r a e l
f rom inside Lebanon) we re held in administrative detention. These citi-
zens we re detained so that they could be used as “bargaining chips” in
f u t u re negotiations for the exchange of Israeli prisoners of war believed to
be held by terrorist organizations. The Lebanese prisoners themselve s
posed no specific threat to national security. This practice was approve d
by the District Court .
In 1997, a panel of three Su p reme Court justices heard an appeal
on the District Court’s approval. The majority opinion held that deten-
tion for the sake of negotiations concerning the future exchange of pris-
oners of war is of vital interest to the State. It found that detention for
this purpose does indeed fall under the authority granted to the minis-
ter of defense by the Law of Ad m i n i s t r a t i ve Detention. The minority
opinion maintained that this law does not entitle the State of Israel to
detain individuals to be used solely as bargaining chips in potential
f u t u re negotiations.
Su b s e q u e n t l y, a request for a further hearing was filed in re s p o n s e
to this decision. Due to the significance of the issues raised in this case, a
panel of nine justices heard the appeal. The Su p reme Court re versed the
District Court’s judgment, as well as that of the earlier Su p reme Court
panel majority, and ruled that the minister of defense does not have the
authority to place a person in administrative detention with the sole pur-
pose of using him as a bargaining chip. The Court explicitly weighed the
human rights of the detainees, specifically those under Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Libert y, against Is r a e l’s national security intere s t s ,
and decided that human rights must pre vail when the detainees do not
t h e m s e l ves threaten national security. I note that the detention was also
held to be illegal since the means used we re not seen as pro p o rtional to
the goal the state was seeking to attain. The detention was not based on
sufficient evidence demonstrating that holding these prisoners would
lead to the release of prisoners of war and soldiers missing in action.
In light of this judgment, most of the detainees we re re l e a s e d .
Two of them, senior members in Lebanese terror organizations, re m a i n e d
in custody after the Knesset enacted a new statute that legalized the
detention of members of terror organizations. 
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERROGATIONS
A SECOND ISSUE that the Court has recently considered invo l ves the use
of force to elicit information re g a rding potential future terrorist activities.
The activities of the General Security Se rvice (GSS) are the central
means by which terrorist acts are pre vented. The GSS investigations are
not aimed solely at gathering evidence in order to prosecute those re s p o n-
sible for past terrorist activities, but also, even primarily, at the pre ve n t i o n
of future terrorist acts. In an effort to further this delicate but extre m e l y
i m p o rtant goal, the GSS garners information from a multitude of
s o u rces, including from suspected terrorists or terrorist accomplices held
in Israeli custody. It is clear that such information has the potential of sav-
ing the lives of tens, if not hundreds, of people as, re g re t t a b l y, the terro r-
ist activities in recent years have primarily been aimed at bombing are a s
in which large crowds congregate, such as buses, malls, and re s t a u r a n t s .
Indeed, the difficulty of this legal question and its tre m e n d o u s
implications for the we l f a re of the State of Israel are heightened by Is r a e l’s
enduring position that if it is not permitted to uncover the identities of
t e r rorists using the inve s t i g a t i ve means it has traditionally employe d ,
h u n d reds of lives are likely to be sacrificed. 
The authority of the GSS to pursue pre ve n t a t i ve investigations has
n e ver been formally legislated, even though the use of physical force or
other means of coercion is forbidden and criminalized under Israeli law.
In re a l i t y, howe ve r, it seems that the GSS has continually made use of
such interro g a t i ve methods in the course of its inve s t i g a t i o n s .
A commission of inquiry headed by re t i red Chief Justice Mo s h e
Landau was appointed to determine the status of physical coercion under
Israeli law. The Landau(Commission) established that in an emergency
situation – described as that of “a ticking time bomb waiting to explode”
– the use of moderate physical force is permitted. The exact nature of
such moderate force was defined in classified portions of the
C o m m i s s i o n’s re p o rt. The legal basis upon which such acts we re permit-
ted was found as being anchored in the criminal defense of necessity. T h e
a p p roach taken by the Commission was that the defense of necessity is
based exc l u s i vely on the pre f e rence of the lesser evil. In other words, this
e xception to criminal liability applies in circumstances in which the
infringement of a criminal prohibition is re q u i red in order to pre vent a
g reater harm. The Commission emphasized that, following the example
of the Model Penal Code in the United States, the test is a flexible one,
w h e re we determine the re l a t i ve weights of the opposing evils which we
must choose.
In September 1999, the Su p reme Court, sitting in a panel of nine
judges, unanimously ruled that such coerc i ve methods are illegal. T h e
decision of the Court detailed various methods utilized by the GSS,
including shaking, the so-called “f rog crouch,” and sleep deprivation, and
concluded that the law does not authorize the GSS to employ them.
The Court also examined the necessity defense, which, as men-
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tioned above, had been the basis for the Landau Commission’s author-
ization of “moderate physical pre s s u re” under certain circ u m s t a n c e s .
The panel concluded that no general authority to establish dire c t i ve s
re g a rding the use of physical means during interrogation can be
implied from the necessity defense. The opinion stated that “[g]eneral
d i re c t i ves governing the use of physical means during interro g a t i o n s
must be rooted in an authorization prescribed by law and not fro m
defenses to criminal liability. ”
As a rule, a defense in criminal law is one that can only be evo k e d
after the fact and does not suffice to grant authorization. An additional
potential problem with the necessity defense also mentioned by the court
is that under Israeli Penal Law the defense of necessity applies solely in
cases where the criminal act is “n e c e s s a ry in an immediate manner,” or
imminent. This is not the case in many of the investigations in which
c o e rc i ve measures are employed. Ne ve rtheless, the Court stated that it
abstains from expressing its opinion re g a rding the question of the consti-
tutionality of a statute explicitly authorizing the GSS to use physical pre s-
s u re in certain interrogations, mainly those conducted in situations of a
“ticking bomb,” where by withholding the information he possesses, the
t e r rorist endangers lives in an immediate sense. The Court did empha-
s i ze, howe ve r, that such legislation must adhere to the re q u i rements set
f o rth in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Libert y. When the issue was
raised in the Knesset, it rejected the suggestions to enact such a statute.
The reason for the rejection, apart from the moral dilemma, was main-
ly the fear that the statute would not comply with the re q u i rements of
the Basic Law or surv i ve the compre h e n s i ve re v i ew of the High Court
of Ju s t i c e .
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES ACTIVITIES
A RELATED ISSUE I turn to now surfaces when the Su p reme Court is
called upon to re v i ew the actions of the Exe c u t i ve Branch, part i c u l a r l y
policies re g a rding the activities of the Israeli Defense Fo rces (IDF). T h e
C o u rt is obliged to re v i ew and issue its ruling in these paramount issues
in “real time” whilst the “cannons ro a r. ”
It has long been the opinion of this Court that “it will not take a
stance as to the manner in which the combat is being conducted” by the
m i l i t a ry forc e s . The position taken is that manners of combat, in which
the lives of the soldiers are at stake, are best decided by the commanders
in the field and not Justices “bearing cloaks.”
The Court, howe ve r, does re v i ew these matters though a legal
prism. This legal prism includes an interpretation of our constitutional
system, domestic legislation, and principles of international law. On c e
the re l e vant laws and principles have been interpreted, the Court then
re v i ews the actions taken, focusing on their pro p o rtionality and legal
l e g i t i m a c y.
In the last year alone, the Su p reme Court has been called upon to
re v i ew actions of the Israeli government and military forces, stemming
f rom Is r a e l’s decision to fight the Palestinian terrorist infrastru c t u re in a
wide-scale operation known as “De f e n s i ve Shield.” I now will re v i ew sev-
eral of these decisions.
In the “Ambulance Ca s e ,” it was alleged by the local Red Cre s c e n t
Society that IDF soldiers fired upon and limited transportation of ambu-
lances. This occurred following numerous instances in which ambulances
we re used for the transfer of arms, explosive materials, and terrorist gun-
men. The Court began by uttering the first and foremost principle that
the ambulances are protected under international law. In light of the fre-
quent instances where ambulances we re used in contravention of the
First Ge n e va Convention, howe ve r, the Court stated that it is acceptable
to re m ove the protection of medical establishments in certain circ u m-
stances. Such protections can be re m oved only after the forces on the
g round use pro p o rtionate means to determine the actual danger poten-
tially posed by the ambulance team they confront. Simply put, the Court
held that the IDF should refrain from firing upon ambulances without
confirming, in eve ry given situation, that they pose a specific threat, eve n
if past experience has shown that ambulances are sometimes used for
a g g re s s i ve purposes.
Another issue recently brought before the Court concerned the
petition of families of suicide bombers against their expulsion fro m
their homes in Ramallah to the Gaza St r i p. The government argued
that this measure may deter other terrorists, who are instructed to act
as human bombs or to carry out other terror attacks, from perpetrating
their schemes.
The Court held that the deportation from Ramallah to the Ga z a
St r i p, both subject to belligerent occupation by the same hostile forc e s ,
amounts to an order of assigned residence that is permitted under Art i c l e
78 of the Fo u rth Ge n e va Convention and not a deportation forbidden
under Article 49 of the same conve n t i o n .
The Court further stated that an order of assigned residence could
be made against a person only if there is a reasonable possibility that the
person himself presents a real danger to the security of the area. If he does
not, consideration of deterring others in and of itself is insufficient. Eve n
when such danger does exist, the IDF commander is authorized to issue
an order of assigned residence only when it will aid in ave rting the dan-
g e r. The Court noted that only when these conditions apply can the IDF
commander also consider the deterrent factor in reaching its decision.
Indeed, the discretion that Israeli law provides to various func-
tionaries, such as the Mi l i t a ry Commander, is not absolute. The question
of deterrence is not a factor that stands on its own, but rather is one re l-
e vant consideration in employing the means of an assigned re s i d e n c e .
To summarize, while both constitutional law and law at large are
unable to solve all problems re g a rding the difficult war against terro r,
they can and do guide us when we confront difficult quandaries of our
times. The Israeli Su p reme Court is increasingly occupied with the chal-
lenges of the myriad of new situations and dilemmas, raised by the unfor-
tunate reality in which we live .
In t e re s t i n g l y, a frequent criticism is that the percentage of the peti-
tions granted from amongst those submitted by residents of the occupied
territories is significantly lower than those submitted by Israeli citizens. It
has been claimed that this fact re p resents the subordination of the Is r a e l i
Su p reme Court to the gove r n m e n t’s security policies, even when these are
h a rdly legal. This criticism, howe ve r, is flawed. In fact, the percentage of
petitions submitted by residents of the occupied territories that fully or
at least partially achieved their purpose is higher than the parallel gener-
al percentage. In many cases, the state, sometimes after the mediation of
the judges, accepts the demands of the residents even before the matter
reaches a judicial decision. T h e re are also cases where the petition is for-
mally rejected, but the Court includes in its decision instructions that
practically allow for the complete or at least partial realization of the aspi-
rations of the petitioners.
In spite of all this, the situation is not ideal. T h e re are situations in
which the balance struck between human rights and national security is
d i s c o n c e rting. Such is the case re g a rding the petitions submitted by fam-
ilies of terrorists against the demolition of their houses. The military
commander is authorized to use such measures by law under the De f e n s e
Regulations 1945. The government argued that these measures are effec-
t i ve, needed, and may deter other terrorists and save lives. The gove r n-
ment there f o re argued that the Court, which re v i ews due process safe-
g u a rds and the general pro p o rtionality of military action, should by and
large defer and not intervene in this matter. This argument was accept-
ed, despite doubts raised as to the compatibility of this ruling with inter-
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national law. It must be added, howe ve r, that in a recent petition bro u g h t
b e f o re me, the state affirmed that unless absolutely necessary, no demo-
lition takes place without allowing for a hearing before the military com-
mander and without giving an ample amount of notice. These condi-
tions give the interested parties the option of appealing to the Hi g h
C o u rt of Justice, if they so desire .
Another extremely difficult issue that currently lies before us is the
targeted assassinations of terrorists posing an acute danger to Israel and
its citizens. These targeted assassinations are today carried out almost ro u-
t i n e l y. The Israeli government believes that these measures are re q u i re d
and appropriate because we are practically in a state of war.
T h e re is currently a petition pending before the Court against this
p o l i c y. Ac c o rding to the re p o rt of Amnesty International submitted by
the petitioner, Palestinians are prohibited from attacking civilians,
including settlers not bearing arms, and civilian objects. Israel is pro h i b-
ited from attacking civilians and civilian objects unless they are firing
upon or otherwise posing an immediate threat to Israeli troops or civil-
i a n s .
The government submitted an opinion by the Attorney Ge n e r a l ,
stating that “The Laws of combat, which are part of international law,
permit injury, during a period of warlike operations, to someone who has
been positively identified as a person who is working to carry out fatal
attacks against Israeli targets.” As of now, the court has asked the part i e s
to comment on this policy after they re v i ew international and Israeli law,
but declined to issue an immediate ord e r.
In sum, it is clear that the difficulties are acute – there is no clear
judicial solution to this growing vicious cycle of violence and re venge –
and the enforcement of human rights is often quite challenging.
Howe ve r, I believe that, as I attempted to demonstrate, much can be
done. Is r a e l’s experience can serve as guide for other democracies seeking
to solve similar dilemmas.
A related issue, which I will not explore fully, is the impact of mod-
ern-day terror on international law. The deterrence of today’s terro r,
which is of the worst and most dangerous kind of terror and includes
many suicide bombers who are willing to sacrifice their lives in order to
kill innocent civilians, present great difficulties. It seems that, largely due
to many years of the Cold Wa r, international law has yet to have agre e d
upon accepted measures to combat these terrorist practices. This in many
cases stems from a lack of understanding by countries that do not have
“hands on” experience with the atrocious reality Israeli has been forced to
face. Thus, a consensus or commonly accepted practice is difficult to
reach. The future development of international law on this issue re m a i n s
to be seen, but will undoubtedly be extremely intere s t i n g .
I conclude with the words of Ludwig Wittgenstein from the
Tractatus Logico-Ph i l o s o p h i c u s , written while fighting on the front lines
during World War I: “We feel that if all possible scientific questions be
a n s we red, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of
course there is no question left, and just this is the answe r.”  H R B
Dalia Dorner, Israeli Supreme Court Justice, presented this lecture at the Washington
College of Law on September 17, 2003.
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